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Friendship Paradox and Attention Economics 
 
Subhash Kak1 
  
Abstract. The friendship paradox is revisited by considering both local and global averages of friends. 
How the economics of attention affects the recruitment of friends is examined. Statistical implications of 
varying individual attentions are investigated and it is argued that this is one reason why the mean of 
friends is higher than the median in social networks. The distribution of friends skews to the right for two 
other reasons: (i) the presence of institutional nodes that increase the mean; and (ii) the dormancy of 
many of the nodes. The difference between friends and friends of friends is a measure of the structural 
information about the network. 
 
1. Introduction  
According to the friendship paradox “our friends have on average more friends than we have” [1]. It 
provides insights in a variety of situations in social and information networks. It was shown, for example, 
that immunization of random acquaintances of random nodes (individuals) leads to a reduction of 
immunization threshold [2].  The paradox has also applicability in citation networks [3]. 
 
The implication of the normal statement of the paradox is that one is speaking of the friends one knows, 
which means we are speaking of the local mean of friends. The mean number of friends can also be 
computed for the entire membership of the graph and this is likely to be different from the varying values 
of the local mean. 
 
This mathematical explanation that is usually provided to the friendship paradox is in terms of the global 
mean of friends. It should be noted that the knowledge members possess about the number of their friends 
affects their behavior. The matter of awareness brings up the question of economy of attention [4]-[7]. In 
the age of computers it is not information that is scarce but rather the attention that can be paid to it by 
individuals. Therefore in a social circle the behavior to approve someone else’s request to be a friend is 
related to the amount of attention available to this individual. The desire to recruit as many friends as 
possible for bragging rights faces the reality of the economics of attention. This leads to a game theoretic 
situation of the kind that has provided insight on the behavior of actors in a social network [7]. There is 
additionally the desire for anonymity [8], which in the past was expressed in the use of masks and now in 
the use of avatars.  
 
One should also note Dunbar’s number [9] (and others similarly determined measures) according to 
which the number of stable relationships (or friends) a person can have is around 150. According to a 
Facebook researcher [10],[11], the average number of friends, µ, on Facebook in 2011 stood at 190 
whereas the median, M, was about 100, indicating that a large number of friends have a low number of 
friends. In the Facebook distribution, the degree (number of friends) ranges from 1 to 5,000, the higher 
number is the limit that was imposed by the company. The data showed short average path lengths and 
high clustering geographically and with respect to age. The fact that the highest number of friends in the 
network stood in the thousands is also because the network consists not only of individuals but also 
corporations and businesses whose count of friends has nothing to do with the cognitive limits of the kind 
described by Dunbar. 
 
In this article, we look at different aspects of the friendship paradox related to the economics of attention. 
We argue that another reason that contributes to the mean of friends being higher than the median in 
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social networks is the high connectivity of institutional entities that have degree running into the 
thousands. 
 
 
2. Global and Local Averages of Friends of Friends (FF) 
A social network is a graph. The nodes are the individual members and the edges represent connectivity.  
The number of connections from a node to all other nodes represents the number of links (or friends) of 
that node.  
 
Let the total number of nodes in a network be n. Let the edges connected to node i be xi, which is the 
number of friends i has, and it may be represented also by F(i). Also let the connectivity between the 
nodes i and j be represented by xij which is a binary variable being 0 if there is no connection and 1 if the 
two nodes are connected. First note, that 
 
x j = xij
i
∑          (1) 
Furthermore, 
 
x2i
i
∑ = xi
j
∑ xij
i
∑         (2) 
 
The number of friends of friends (FF) of node i is determined by counting the friends of friends of i.  
 
Also note that the friends of friends of node i equals: 
 
FF(i) = xij
j
∑ x j         (3) 
There are now two means of friends of friends that we call µFF (i) and µFF (global) : 
 
µFF (i) = FF(i)
xi
        (4) 
 
µFF (i) =
xij
j
∑ x j
xij
j
∑
        (5) 
 
µFF (global) =
x2i
i
∑
xi
i
∑
        (6) 
The mean number of edges (or friends) is Fµ : 
 
µF =
1
n
xi
i
∑          (7) 
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The total number of friends of friends is given by ∑
i
ix
2
. We can also write that 
VAR(X) = σ 2X = 1
n
xi
2
i
∑ − µ 2F        (8) 
 
xi
2
i
∑ = nµ 2F + nσ 2         (9) 
 
xi
2
i
∑
xi
i
∑
= µFF =
nµ 2F + nσ 2
nµF
       (10) 
 
µFF = µF +
σ 2
µF
        (10) 
 
In other words, 
 
µFF ≥ µF          (11) 
 
This is the purported proof of the friendship paradox.  
It follows that for a fully connected network of n nodes, for which σ2 is zero, FFF µµ = and it equals n-1. 
Likewise for other networks where the connectivity is the same for each node, as in the network where 
each node has a single link (as in 1 and 2 are connected, and 3 and 4, and so on), the two are equal. Since 
equality is obtained when the network is regularly connected, we can conclude that the level of inequality 
in (11) depends on the nature of connectivity of the networks. One might propose that the level of 
inequality (which is the variance associated with the degree) codes the amount of information in the 
structure of the network. Information theoretic approaches to the information in the structure of the 
network may also be adopted [12],[13]. 
The result (11) does not address the information related to friends at the local level. What we ought to be 
looking for is that on an average the mean of the  is greater than xi.  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
     
Figure 1. Network 1 
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Example 1. Table 1 gives the number of friends (F) for the network of Figure 1 that consists of five nodes 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5; it also gives the number of friends of friends (FF). 
 
Table 1. Connectivity of the network of Figure 1 ( µFF (global)=2) 
Node F(i) FF(i) 
 > 
F(i) 
1 3 4 1.33 no 
2 2 4 2.00 - 
3 1 2 2.00 yes 
4 1 3 2.00 yes 
5 1 3 2.00 yes 
 
In this example, out of 5 cases, three have more friends than their own and one has value that is equal; 
only one case (node 1) has friends more than that of friends. As is clear, this is due to the double counting 
of edges in the definition of friends. 
 
Various nodes are not likely to know the global value of FF. What they know is the average value of 
friends of their friends which is FF(i). 
 
Example 2. Consider the network of Figure 3. It consists of 5 nodes  
 
 
  
 
      Figure 2. Network 2 
 
 
  Table 2. Connectivity of the network of Figure 2  
( =1.33) 
Node F(i) FF(i) 
 
>F(i) 
1 2 2 1.00 no 
2 1 2 2.00 yes 
3 1 1 1.00 no 
4 1 1 1.00 no 
5 1 2 2.00 yes 
 
 
The is larger than local count of friends in 4 out of 5 cases. On the other hand, the local 
mean of friends of friends is greater than local friends in only 2 out of 5 cases; in 2 cases it is identical; 
and in one case it is less.  
 
In other words, we see that the local count of friends of friends as compared to friends may not be as 
different as in the global case of inequality (11). 
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Example 3. Consider the network of Figure 4. It consists of 5 nodes  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Network 3 
 
   
Table 3. Connectivity of the network of Figure 4 ( =3.14) 
Node F(i) FF(i) 
 
>F(i) 
1 4 10 2.50 no 
2 3 10 3.33 yes 
3 3 10 3.33 yes 
4 3 10 3.33 yes 
5 1 4 4.00 yes 
 
In this example we see that for 80 percent of nodes the number of friends of friends is larger than the 
number of friends. 
 
3. Economy of Attention  
The attention one can pay to friends decreases as their number increases. At the same time the amount of 
information that is available to a user increases as the number of friends increases. The first of these is 
like the demand curve whereas the amount of information is supply. 
 
Figure 4. Supply and demand curves for friends  
(x-axis: count of friends; y-axis: cost) 
 
In Figure 4, the demand curve represents attention and the x-axis represents the count of friends. When 
the number of friends is low, the individual can allocate more attention to each than when the number of 
friends is high. Hence the negative slope of this curve. On the other hand, the supply of information from 
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the friends increases as the number of friends increases (Supply 1). Like the supply-demand curves of 
traditional economics, the point at which the two curves intersect represents the equilibrium point. If the 
supply from each friend goes down (Supply 2), the number of friends at the equilibrium point will be 
greater. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, not all nodes in a social network are individuals. There are many that 
are institutions, groups, or businesses. Such nodes, for which we will use the collective label of 
institution, do not have the same constraints of attention since these nodes serve as clearing houses of 
information or as chat sites. Such institutional sites will have many, many more links than those that 
represent real individuals. 
Institutional nodes skew the distribution of friends towards the right. Furthermore, the fact that most users 
are relatively inactive shifts the supply curve towards the right that further skews the distribution.  Both of 
these contribute to the mean becoming much greater than the median as is true for Facebook data [10]. 
4. Relationship between Median and Mean 
Let the median and mean of friends in a social network be denoted by M and µ, respectively. As 
mentioned before, the values for these in 2010 were 100 and 190. This tells us [14] that the standard 
deviation σ is at least 90.  
 
We take the number of friends to be random variable X. Since the absolute-value and the square functions 
are convex and the median minimizes the absolute deviation function: 
 
)()( MXEMXEM −≤−=−µ       (12) 
σµµ =−≤−≤ ))(()( 2XEXE       (13) 
Note further the data [10] indicates that the distribution of friends is essentially unimodal. Therefore, the 
bound (13) can be made tighter [15]. 
The degree distribution in a random network [16] will be binomial (or Poisson if the nodes is very large) 
but social networks are not totally random. The skewness of the degree distribution has been studied by 
many authors (e.g.[17]). 
For a simple analysis, the network may be replaced by an aggregate model where the variable takes just a 
few values but provides the correct median and mean values. Thus the Facebook data may be replaced by, 
say, 7-point or 9-point distributions as follows: 
 7-point: (1, 5, 20, 100, 200, 200, 900) with M=100, µ≈ 200, and σ ≈ 375  (14) 
 9-point: (1, 2, 5, 20, 100, 300, 300, 300, 800) with M= 100, µ≈ 200, and σ ≈ 290 (15) 
The measured value of the standard deviation and other modes in the degree distribution curve can be 
used to pick the specific model. 
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Let µ-M = a and we use the knowledge that a is positive and the distribution is skewed to the right.  We 
can further estimate the probability that the number of friends is within the interval (µ-a, µ+a). Let a = 
ασ, then by Chebyshev’s inequality, 
2
1)Pr(
α
ασµ ≤≥−X        (16) 
Since Pr (X≤M) = 0.5, the above inequality can be modified to: 
5.01)Pr( 2 −≤≥− αασµX        (17) 
This is equivalent to: 
5.0)()2Pr( 2
2
−
−
≤−≥
M
MX
µ
σµ       (18) 
This inequality can be useful for distributions where α is close to 1. For the specific case when it is 1, the 
inequality may be rewritten as: 
5.0)Pr( ≤+≥ σµX         (19) 
But, of course, such a case will not be typical of social networks as the value of σ for these is likely to be 
much higher than the difference between the mean and the median.  
Since social networks are evolving networks, the characteristics will keep on changing under pressures 
from other competing networks and also the changing behavior of participants. The behavior of the 
network is likely to have a chaotic evolutionary component [18].  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has shown how the averages for friends of friends on the one hand and friends on the other can 
vary greatly. The friendship paradox was described in terms of both local and global averages of friends. 
How the economics of attention affects the recruitment of friends was discussed. It was shown that the 
distribution of friends skews to the right for three reasons: (i) constraints on attention; (ii) the presence of 
institutional nodes that increases the mean; and (iii) the shifting of the equilibrium to the right due to the 
dormancy of many of the nodes.  
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